At the 2025 ULI Asia Pacific Summit—May 26–29, in Hong Kong—a panel of Asian economic and geopolitical experts addressed one of today’s most immediate global concerns: the implications of U.S.–China economic decoupling and the broader geopolitical shifts reshaping global trade and investment.

The panel comprised moderator James McGregor, chairman, Greater China at APCO Worldwide; Shane Tedjarati, founder, chairman and CEO of Tribridge Group; Chan Heng Chee, ambassador-at-large with Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Dan Wang, director, China, at Eurasia Group. To ensure a free exchange of views, the session was held under the Chatham House rule.

U.S. and China: from tensions to transformation

Relations between the United States and China have entered a prolonged period of strain, which has been exacerbated by the imposition of high tariffs on China and other nations. In response, China has doubled down on self-sufficiency, reinforcing President Xi Jinping’s long-term strategic ambitions. The result is a bifurcation in global trade: While the United States pursues a domestic industrial revival through security-first trade pacts, China is consolidating its manufacturing leadership—particularly through the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) bloc, now its top export market. Projections suggest that, by 2030, China’s industrial output could constitute nearly half of what is produced by the developed world.

As the U.S. focuses on domestic reshoring, China is expanding its global economic footprint by exporting not only goods but also capital and labor through long-term overseas investments. Someone noted that if China is prohibited from exporting labor-intensive products, it has to export labor directly; if it cannot export capital-intensive products, it has to export capital directly.

This new phase—which some panelists described as “reglobalization”—has China embedding its supply chains across Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa. These shifts are not temporary; many of the overseas operations now boast more advanced technology than their Chinese equivalents, suggesting a permanent recalibration.

A further consequence of the current environment is the emergence of what is called multipolarity, with several emerging global powers, including not just China but also India. This multipolarity is asymmetrical, though, with India and China in different stages of growth and economic maturity.

Meanwhile, ASEAN nations are trying to hedge against superpower rivalry by weaving a diverse web of trade relationships, not just with China but also with Europe, the Middle East, and the broader Global South.

China’s model: scale, speed, and strategic patience

China’s distinctive economic approach—state-supported, capital-heavy, and scale-oriented—has produced domestic champions such as BYD, Huawei, and Xiaomi. These firms flourish within a protected home market, allowing them to undercut rivals globally with lean cost structures. Ironically, some of China’s most cutting-edge firms remain among the least profitable, which raises a question: Is the domestic monopoly environment a proving ground for global ambitions?

Yet global dominance requires more than manufacturing strength. As one speaker noted: “Very few companies in China have figured out how to truly localize and truly capture global markets.”

The next challenge for Chinese firms is not simply going global, it is acting global. Mastering regulatory regimes, brand expectations, and operational norms in Western markets such as the United States and Europe remains a critical hurdle. Without that “global DNA,” their reach may remain limited, despite their scale.

No winners, just shifts

In closing, the panel challenged the conventional framing of the U.S.–China trade war: It is unlikely to have an outright winner. While Washington focuses on rebuilding domestic supply chains and tightening trade controls, China adapts, reroutes, and localizes. ASEAN economies, in turn, are emerging as strategic beneficiaries by capitalizing on China-plus-one strategies to draw investment and diversify manufacturing bases. Even longstanding players such as Japan and South Korea are regaining significance as Chinese firms pursue more sophisticated global engagement.

What is emerging is not the end of globalization, panelists suggested, but instead its reinvention. China is not walking away from the world but is redesigning its role in the world. Chinese companies are embedding across Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa—no longer as distant exporters but instead as increasingly local operators.

China is also predicted to move away from its soft peg to the U.S. dollar in favor of a more diverse basket of currencies. Doing so would signal a deeper strategic pivot away from U.S. financial influence and toward a Global South and Eurasian alignment.