Earlier this month, a former aide to the New York governor’s office was charged with acting as an unregistered agent for China. She stands accused of altering her bosses’ public speeches on China to make them more favorable to Beijing, obtaining forged documents to facilitate visas for Chinese delegations, and blocking access by Taiwanese representatives to the governor’s office. She is also accused of receiving lavish economic benefits in exchange for this work.

But this is just part of a larger pattern of Beijing’s efforts to leverage the Chinese diaspora for foreign influence. In the U.S. and elsewhere, Chinese Communist Party-linked individuals have funneled money, served as political brokers, and harassed Beijing’s critics. Pro-government groups lined the streets of San Francisco last year to welcome Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and anti-CCP activists were assaulted.

The CCP fears that a diaspora exposed to liberal ideas will undermine its authoritarian rule at home. With China’s growing global might, Beijing is explicitly using the diaspora to advance its interests abroad. Speeches by President Xi and other top officials refer to the diaspora as a strategic resource to be mobilized, whether to “tell China’s story well” to foreigners, or achieve national reunification and defend against so-called separatists.

China’s diaspora policies are deeply intertwined with its system of political control known as the “United Front,” which seeks to silence critics and mobilize supporters worldwide. The CCP unambiguously believes that anyone of Chinese descent—because of ethnic roots and cultural similarities—should be inherently loyal to their purported homeland, and by extension the Party. 

Despite diverse beliefs within Chinese communities, Beijing’s strong influence over diaspora associations and media disproportionately amplifies pro-CCP positions while drowning out alternative viewpoints. In Canada, an initial report from May looking at foreign influence operations concluded that Beijing uses community organizations to attack politicians critical of the Party and promote pro-China candidates. This can make politicians fearful of poking the bear, be it criticizing the Uyghur genocide or supporting Hong Kong democracy, because they assume it will cost votes and donations. It can also lead politicians to sometimes unwittingly repeat Beijing’s talking points. For example, an Australian legislator participated in CCP-organized protests against the Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to a controversial shrine, and reportedly condemned a Tibetan protest in Sydney as “thugs who attacked the Chinese consulate.”

To be sure, individuals have the right to organize in support of China. But a line is crossed when this support infringes on the freedoms of others who may disagree with the Party. Pro-Beijing diaspora regularly monitor and harass dissidents as well as everyday diaspora, who are often caught between a rock and a hard place.

It’s important to note that not everyone who displays public patriotism or meets with Chinese officials is driven by fervent ideology. Some may feel they have little choice because of social pressure; or may pursue self-interested goals, such as status, political connections, and business profit. While U.S. law enforcement has documented several cases of CCP interference, activists complain that the true extent is far from addressed.

Washington must push back on Chinese foreign influence. But, crucially, it must ensure that does not lead to domestic prejudice. Anti-China sentiment has already infected parts of the public sphere, from racist comments (like Donald Trump referring to COVID-19 as the “Chinese virus”) to recent state legislation restricting real estate purchases by Chinese nationals that the ACLU says is a “form of discrimination” based on race, nationality, and visa status.

Overreaction runs the risk of further alienating Chinese diaspora communities and pushing them into Beijing’s arms. Studies have found that relatively cosmopolitan Chinese students in the U.S. who experience racial discrimination, which a narrative of foreign influence can help fuel, become more supportive of authoritarian rule in China. The Chinese government amplifies the issue of anti-Asian hate to tell the diaspora that they are not welcome where they are.

The best offense is proactive defense. We should not let Beijing claim to speak for all ethnic Chinese nor all Asians. Elected leaders should work with legitimate Asian American grassroots organizations to reach out to local communities and gain a better understanding of issues important to them, such as public safety or affirmative action. Sustained engagement beyond election periods will undermine Beijing’s narratives of diaspora marginalization and democratic dysfunction. The federal and state governments should support robust Chinese American civil society networks that reflect the community’s diversity.

The Chinese community in the U.S. is only growing. Tackling these issues now is an investment in future resilience. Just as how strengthening U.S. democracy is fundamental to countering Beijing’s narrative of a failing West, embracing diaspora communities as assets will strengthen America while limiting Beijing’s ability to weaken the U.S. internally.