Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief.

The highlights this week: China watches the U.S. presidential election carefully though it is not heavily invested, an unusual U.S.-China prisoner swap from September raises questions, and a prominent Chinese virologist produces pioneering coronavirus research with an international team.

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s China Brief.

The highlights this week: China watches the U.S. presidential election carefully though it is not heavily invested, an unusual U.S.-China prisoner swap from September raises questions, and a prominent Chinese virologist produces pioneering coronavirus research with an international team.

As the United States votes today, check out FP’s live election coverage, with updates and global perspectives from our staff and contributors. The page is free for all.

China is paying attention to the U.S. presidential election today—but it is not heavily invested. So far, Beijing has maintained a carefully neutral position on the vote, referring to events such as President Joe Biden’s withdrawal from the race as “internal affairs” for the United States.

Although Chinese social media has a pro-Donald Trump bent, the political leadership in Beijing has shown no particular favoritism toward him or Vice President Kamala Harris—or even signs of being more worried about one possibility than the other.

In general, Chinese media tends to downplay U.S. elections, portraying them as chaotic or farcical events and simply targeting the administration in power. Beijing has an obvious interest in discrediting the idea of democracy and emphasizing the divisiveness of multiparty systems.

Usually, Chinese state media engages in criticism of supposed China-bashing during campaign season, but China itself was largely absent from the discussion in the United States this year, except in politicians’ attempts to smear opponents.

There are also few signs of serious Chinese attempts to interfere with the U.S. presidential election, which might reveal Beijing’s preferences. Chinese hackers have tapped phones from both campaigns and targeted several dozen other individuals working on security issues, but that is routine information-gathering.

Actual interference efforts have concentrated on state and local races, targeting candidates who are outspoken about Beijing. Contrast that with Chinese efforts in Canada, which attempted a wider sabotage of the Conservative Party in addition to going after specific politicians.

To be sure, the long-running Chinese botnet known as Spamouflage has boosted Trump and attacked Biden at points, but it seems more devoted to general provocation than political purpose. As X (formerly Twitter) has swung toward boosting right-wing content under owner Elon Musk, botnet operators looking to boost their reach will likely move in that direction.

There are coherent arguments that China will favor Trump because he is likely to undermine U.S. alliances and is seen as having an unreliable and mercenary attitude toward Taiwan. (The Taiwanese public overwhelmingly supports Harris.) But that perspective may overestimate how clearly China reads U.S. politics. In my experience, conspiratorialism prevails among Chinese officials, and there is a strong belief that U.S. democracy is a sham covering up more powerful forces.

More nuanced and informed observers are increasingly shut out under Chinese President Xi Jinping, as they are seen as too favorable to the United States or even as potential security risks after spending time overseas. But even respected experts who retain a platform share a (reasonable) conviction that hawkishness is one of the few remaining bipartisan issues in Washington, and that little will change in U.S.-China relations no matter who wins.

On a personal level, China’s leadership will likely be more comfortable with Trump than Harris. For one thing, Trump is a known quantity—and he frequently praises Xi even as he denigrates China. And it’s not just his four years of relations with China that make him a more familiar figure; it’s also that he represents a type for which the Chinese leadership has a well-worn playbook: older businessmen with easily stroked egos and family interests in the country.

The almost exclusively male Chinese leadership is less comfortable dealing with women; it reserves vicious rhetoric for female leaders, most prominently targeting former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. Former U.S. presidential candidate Hillary Clinton was strongly disliked in China, largely thanks to her 1990s promotion of women’s rights as human rights. That history, combined that with pervasive anti-Black racism, mean that Beijing may struggle to treat Harris as a serious geopolitical player.

U.S.-China prisoner swap. In an unusual move, in September, the United States reportedly exchanged an unnamed Chinese prisoner for Chinese American pastor David Lin, who had been in jail since 2006. Lin was charged with contract fraud in 2009, which he denies, but he was also assisting underground Chinese churches. His health seriously deteriorated in prison.

The United States has rarely conducted formal prisoner exchanges with China. However, three years ago, an effective quid pro quo arranged between China, Canada, and the United States returned Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou in exchange for two imprisoned Canadian citizens.

It’s still unclear who was swapped for Lin. One strong possibility is Xiaolei Wu, a student convicted with stalking and harassing a pro-democracy activists in the United States who was granted clemency and returned to China around the time that Lin was released. But that raises more questions, given Wu’s short nine-month sentence; it’s possible that Wu was related to someone with clout. 

Ultranationalist commentator returns. Hu Xijin, a nationalist commentator and former editor of the Chinese Communist Party-run Global Times, has returned to social media after a three-month disappearance. Hu vanished after writing a piece calling for greater promotion of private business—a sensitive topic given the state of the Chinese economy and Xi’s determination to retain a dominant role for the state.

Hu, who was my boss when I worked at the English edition of the Global Times, is a great tabloid entrepreneur forced to operate within the confines of state media. He has long sought attention from the public while also looking for protection from above.

When he was an editor, I was told by staff at People’s Daily, the parent of Global Times, that he had an unofficial quota for acceptable “political mistakes”—roughly one every six months. That he was punished more harshly this time is in part because he no longer operates under the aegis of state media, but it is also a sign of how Chinese authorities now overreact to even friendly commentators.

FP’s Most Read This Week

Tech and Business

Virus research cooperation. Shi Zhengli—a prominent Chinese virologist whose name was caught up in the controversial lab leak theory of COVID-19’s origins—has helped produce pioneering new research on coronavirus receptors that may help develop new drugs, working alongside other scientists from China, Switzerland, and the United States.

It is a promising sign for international cooperation on disease research, which was damaged by mutual accusations the origins of the initial COVID-19 outbreak. Before the pandemic, Shi and her work were widely respected by her international peers.

Chinese sanctions hit U.S. drones. Skydio, the largest U.S. drone maker, faces severe supply chain problems after being sanctioned by China in mid-October. Skydio is reliant on batteries made by a Japanese-owned factory in China. Beijing has made increasing use of sanctions in its ongoing tech war with Washington, following the latter’s lead.

In doing so, China hopes to pressure U.S. firms into lobbying on its behalf, as well as to dissuade sales to Taiwan. However, the long-term result may be to force further decoupling between the United States and mainland China.