Since the overthrow of Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian rule in August of 2024, two shifts in the region are reshaping its geopolitical environment. The first shift has been the steady deterioration in India’s relations with Bangladesh. Troubled by the sudden erosion of its influence, New Delhi has been unable to reduce the speed or degree of divergence in Dhaka’s India policy. At the beginning of 2024, Bangladesh was a prime example of the success of India’s neighborhood first policy. By the end of the year, it had become the most prominent example of its limits.

Many commentators have documented the reasons for this Delhi-Dhaka breakup. I want to speak about the other major shift in South Asia and analyze its antecedents and possible consequences. The growing bonhomie between Dhaka and Islamabad is intriguing, to say the least. Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, broke away and became independent in 1971 with India’s help. Pakistan recognized Bangladesh in 1974, and ever since the relations between the two nations have seesawed. But in the past few months, the two nations have moved rapidly to renew and establish military and intelligence cooperation.

Strategic Relations and India’s Concerns

Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh’s de facto ruler, has made little effort to restore relations with India, or even address India’s two primary concerns — empowerment of radical forces and the rise of anti-Hindu violence — but has worked hard to improve relations with Pakistan. His meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif at the D-8 Summit in Cairo in December 2024 was the turning point. Yunus called for a resolution of issues relating to 1971, perhaps a call for resolution for Bangladesh’s lingering grievances. Sharif agreed to look into the matter and called for more strategic relations between the two “brotherly nations.”

A flurry of activities has since highlighted that the two nations are serious about investing in a strategic relationship. A delegation of senior Bangladeshi military officers led by Lt. General S. M. Kamarul-Hassan visited Pakistan and was welcomed by Pakistan’s Army Chief General Asim Munir. The Bangladeshi navy participated in Pakistan’s annual multilateral naval exercise called “Aman.” This is a major step forward in military cooperation. There are reports in the Indian press — but disputed by Dhaka — that a delegation led by Pakistan’s intelligence chief, Director General of ISI General Asim Malik, was in Dhaka most recently. These are not mere diplomatic exchanges; they are clear indications of enhanced security and intelligence cooperation.

Beijing will welcome this development since Pakistan is its “iron brother” and China also enjoys close relations with Bangladesh. Needless to say, it is raising concerns in New Delhi.

There are three security-related worries for India from these developments. One, the release of radical elements from Bangladeshi prisons who harbor anti-India sentiments is driving a wedge between India and Bangladesh. Two, the mainstreaming of these radicals has unleashed violence against Bangladeshi Hindus. Narendra Modi’s government is under pressure from Hindutva forces in India to act in their defense. The Modi government has raised this issue with Yunus and with the U.S. government on more than one occasion. And three, India is worried that Pakistan might use Bangladesh as a springboard to destabilize India’s Northeast. Imagine a steady supply of weapons to Kukis in Manipur that would not only intensify that conflict but also expand it in the region.

What Is in It for Pakistan?

Pakistan has long felt alienated and marginalized from South Asia due to the rise of the Indian economy and its cultural hegemony over the region. But the growing strife between India and Bangladesh and Yunus’ unexpected outreach to Pakistan has given Islamabad an opportunity to once again become relevant to South Asia. Pakistan never misses any opportunity to cause trouble for India, and this growing strategic partnership with Bangladesh gives it a look at India’s weak underbelly, the country’s vulnerable Northeast.

In the past few years, India has nurtured a growing relationship with Pakistan’s ally and client, Afghanistan, effectively taking away Pakistan’s strategic depth. By cultivating a similar relationship with Bangladesh, Pakistan can now return the favor.

Pakistan does not have the resources to provide economic benefits, like India, which provided billions of dollars in loans and credit to Bangladesh. Bangladesh-India trade is around $15 billion — 15 times the value of Bangladesh-Pakistan trade. Pakistan cannot replace India as a trade partner or an economic crutch. So, it must rely on the mounting anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh and the reciprocal anti-Bangladesh fervor in India to cement its newfound partnership with Bangladesh.

What Does Bangladesh Want?

Bangladesh is in search of a new form of nationalism, a new form of government, and new allies. It appears that the current political leadership, including interim leader Yunus, equate freedom from Sheikh Hasina and her authoritative government with freedom from Indian hegemony. Therefore, their attempts to bring about change at home also involve a new India-free foreign policy. Their problems are compounded by the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president because they are now without financial and diplomatic support that the Biden administration provided. They feel more vulnerable and consequently, their outreach to Pakistan and China gains more urgency.

Bangladesh is altering the geopolitics of South Asia by bringing back Pakistan and helping increase the footprint of China, whose shadow already looms large over the region. But the recent thawing of China-India relations, which promises huge trade dividends for Chinese exports looking for markets other than U.S. and Europe to expand, may temper China’s anti-India designs in Bangladesh. A prudent China and an uncertain U.S. leave Bangladesh at the mercy of an increasingly belligerent India, hence the sudden love for Pakistan.

Bangladesh now faces three major challenges, from India, from the United States, and from the Awami League. India is putting a lot of pressure on Bangladesh with regard to the plight of its minorities. Bangladesh depends heavily on India for food, power, and raw materials for its garment industry, the mainstay of its economy. India can use these dependencies to undermine it. Under Trump, the U.S. appears to be abandoning Bangladesh. Without U.S. support Bangladesh’s fragile economy as well as fragile government could easily collapse. And finally, the Awami League is planning mass protests, and this could create more domestic turmoil and security challenges for the Yunus government.

Net Assessment

Pakistan’s growing alliance with Bangladesh will not bring stability to the region; rather it will raise the geopolitical temperature and provoke more pressure from India on Bangladesh. Washington’s disinterest in Bangladesh will mean India has greater freedom to deal with Bangladesh. China’s improving relations with India and greater access to its markets will slow down the security-related assistance that Bangladesh needs. China is less likely to upset India while working hard to de-escalate tensions with India. Bangladesh is in for greater instability and the India-Pakistan-Bangladesh triangle is in for more intense military and intelligence-related maneuverings.