A nuanced mix of cooperation and competition, shaped by overlapping and divergent interests, China and Russia’s longstanding presence in Central Asia has been undeniable, but underlying tensions remain.

Central Asia is of significant importance to both China and Russia, as they share vital security interests and important political and economic concerns in the region, explains a report of the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI).

However, Russia’s diminished reputation as a security provider due to the war in Ukraine has prompted regional states to explore partnerships with other powers, including China, whose security presence is expanding.

While both Beijing and Moscow seek to maintain regional stability and prevent uprisings, which they attribute to Western influence, China’s diplomacy is becoming more assertive and increasingly independent of Russia.

Their interests diverge significantly on the economic sphere. China’s infrastructure projects and trade networks under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) integrate Central Asia into its economic orbit, while Russia’s approach through the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) aims for a closed, Russia-centric market, creating a zero-sum dynamic.

The report argues that the power shift from Russia to China is likely to deepen competition between the two powers. If current trends persist, the prospects for rivalry in Central Asia outweigh those for cooperation.

Friend or foe?

Experts at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace observe the same. Although both sides have invested in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a multilateral alternative to the Western-led order, their economic initiatives highlight conflicting goals in the region.

While Russia once sought to align its project with China’s, little progress was made, especially as China’s influence has grown, in contrast to Russia’s diminishing effect in the region.

China’s strategic patience and growing economic and political appeal have made it a more attractive partner for Central Asian states, particularly as fears of Russian aggression rise.

The disparity is evident. China’s agreements with Central Asian nations, such as the Xi’an declaration, are comprehensive and generous, reflecting its role as a dominant yet “benevolent” regional power.

In contrast, its agreements with Russia, such as the joint statement between presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, are limited and focused mainly on Beijing’s priorities, reflecting a more competitive dynamic between two powers of comparable stature.

Common enemy

Though fissures between China and Russia exist, the two powers continue to collaborate to exclude a common adversary – the West. Both sides still share the goal of creating an alternative global order, despite economic and strategic shifts redefining their roles in the region.

A report from the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS) mentions Central Asia’s efforts at diversifying partnerships beyond Beijing and Moscow, including with the United States, Europe, and Gulf states. This diversification reflects their desire to safeguard sovereignty and avoid overdependence on any single power.

The Ukraine conflict has amplified these dynamics, with Russia increasingly preoccupied and China cautiously expanding its security presence to address potential instability, such as threats emerging from Afghanistan.

For the US and its allies, the shifting landscape presents an opportunity to engage more deeply with Central Asian nations. By supporting regional connectivity, sovereignty, and economic development, the West could offer a counterbalance to Russian and Chinese influence, reinforcing the independence and political agency of these states.

‘Les fleurs du mal’

The evolving relationship between Russia and China has often been characterised as an “axis of authoritarianism”, remarks the former Australian ambassador to Beijing, Geoff Raby.

The heightened Western sanctions that followed after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, only reinforced Moscow and Beijing’s mutual interest in reshaping the global order to accommodate authoritarian governance.

However, Raby also sees potential tensions due to historical grievances and divergent approaches to security, as well as China surpassing Russia both economically and geopolitically, as elements straining the partnership, in what once was Russia’s sphere of influence.

Raby argues that as long as Putin is at the helm, a US-Russia alignment against China, as a “reverse Kissinger” strategy, is unlikely given Moscow’s current orientation and conflicting interests with the West.

A post-Putin re-engagement of Russia with Europe could counterbalance China’s dominance in Eurasia, but absent such a shift, Raby concludes that China’s unchecked ascent could mirror the US’ early 20th-century consolidation of regional hegemony, enabling it to project power globally.

Balancing act

But where two are fighting, a third one wins. One country in the region has managed to avoid domination by either power, cultivating relationships with a diverse array of global partners, including the European Union and the US, to maintain its autonomy.

That country, according to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), is Kazakhstan.

Its trade strategy has been central to its independence. Although China became Kazakhstan’s top trade partner in 2023, the diversification of partners never stopped.

Kazakhstan has resisted external pressures from both China and Russia, asserting its independence through decisions such as refusing to join the BRICS+ expansion and managing trade disputes with Russia.

Overall, the CFR argues that Kazakhstan has demonstrated a sophisticated balancing act, leveraging its strategic location and diverse partnerships to foster economic growth and maintain its autonomy.

By diversifying its economy and trade relations, Kazakhstan is steadily building a more resilient and self-sufficient future while maintaining a delicate equilibrium among competing global powers.

[Edited By Brian Maguire | Euractiv’s Advocacy Lab ]