Written by Raian Hossain.

Image credit: 11.11 總統接見113年「國際青年大使交流計畫」訪團及「農業青年大使『新南向』交流計畫」訪團 by 總統府/Flickr, license: CC BY 2.0.

The relationship between the island of Taiwan and South Asian states remains very limited, except for the recent development of relations with India. Due to the China factor, South Asian countries’ engagement with Taiwan has mostly remained confined to trade and commerce. The inclusion of South Asia in the New Southbound Policy (NSP) during the Tsai Ing-wen administration is a good example of Taiwan’s desire to establish and improve ties with the region. This article examines Taiwan relations and engagement in South Asia, taking India and Bangladesh as two case studies. This article argues that Taiwan should strategise to interact with different South Asian countries based on their own merit and limitations and find areas of mutual interest to increase its regional footprint. 

Taiwan in South Asia: India

Since the implementation of Tsai’s NSP in 2016, the nature of Taiwan-India relations has also diversified with talent education, scientific and technological cooperation, think tank collaboration, national security and trade and commerce. Since the establishment of the India-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Forum in 2016, members of this delegation visited India in 2018. However, years have passed since the revival of the forum in 2020, and there has yet to be much progress in this parliamentary forum. The lack of official diplomatic relations limits traditional or direct political and security ties. However, Taiwan had attracted attention from the Indian military and strategic circle, as can be seen when India Chief of Defense Staff General Anil Chauhan 2023 asked to asses India’s possible action if China attacked Taiwan. There is increased importance and prominence of India in Taiwan’s defence and security as three former Indian service chiefs were invited to Taiwan to attend the Ketagalan Forum on Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue in 2023.

Taiwan and India’s partnership expansion can be best seen in the progress of the semiconductor industry. As Taiwan is looking to reduce its economic activity with China and explore alternative means, the Taiwanese Foxconn has seen an expansion in its operation in India since setting up a factory in Tamil Nadu in 2017. Both Taiwan and India started to negotiate for an India-Taiwan FTA to bolster the economic and trade engagement. In the absence of official ties, non-state actors like think tanks play a significant role in bolstering the Taiwan-India ties.

In 2024, India-Taiwan relations improved, strengthened, and diversified. The interaction between Narendra Modi and Lai Ching-te in June 2024 following the outcome of the Indian general election also reflects the increasingly deepening bilateral ties between the two. In February 2024, Taiwan and India signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on migration and mobility, which allows Indian workers to seek employment on the island in areas of shortage of workers like agriculture, manufacturing and construction. In June 2024, Taiwanese and Indian think tanks, with the help of US academics, conducted a war game called the Taiwan, US and India Trilateral Joint Military Simulation Workshop about the impact and effect of the crisis in the Taiwan Strait and the Sino-Indian border. The year 2024 also saw India’s Tata Electronics and Taiwan’s Powerhouse Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (PSMC) complete the Definitive Agreement for establishing a semiconductor manufacturing facility in India. Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation (TAEF) and Observer Research Foundation (ORF) of India also had their third Taiwan-India Dialogue, showing commitment to strengthening the partnership. Notably, a Taiwan delegation also participated in India’s flagship foreign policy, Raisina Dialogue 2024. Despite pressure from mainland China, Taiwan has managed to open its third office in Mumbai, India.

Taiwan in South Asia: Bangladesh

Unlike India, Taiwan’s engagement in Bangladesh is not multi-dimensional. Rather, it mostly remained limited to trade and commerce. Taiwan opened its Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) in Dhaka in 2004 but mostly failed to function due to China’s pressure on the Bangladeshi government. Bangladesh continues to be committed and often reiterates her firm adherence to the ‘One China’ policy. Most of the investments from Taiwan in Bangladesh are in zippers, polyesters, nylons, interlinks, footwear, fabrics, leather and ready-made garments. In the recent past, Bangladesh reaffirmed its ‘One China’ policy, particularly when tension escalated between the US and China after former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan. Currently, the Taiwan Trade Center Dhaka (TTCD), a liaison of the Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TAITRA), works in Bangladesh to promote business, commerce and trade between Dhaka and Taipei.

The July-August public uprising in 2024 and the new political development in Bangladesh do not have any direct implications for Taiwan. However, any political development in the region has indirect implications everywhere. After the fall of the Hasina regime, Bangladesh-India relations have drastically deteriorated, which has led India to restrict visa applications from Bangladesh for non-urgent cases temporarily. As most South Asian countries’ visas for Taiwan are issued from India, it has become a challenge for Bangladeshis to acquire visas since India changed its visa policy towards Bangladesh. Also, many experts expect that with the fall of the Hasina regime, China’s footprint and opportunities are likely to increase in Bangladesh. The Hasina regime, which the massive student-public uprising toppled, was termed a ‘hybrid regime’ and ‘authoritarian’ in posture due to election manipulation, corruption and human rights violations. The transformation from autocracy to democracy in Taiwan in the 1980s- 1990s is probably a good example for Bangladesh to learn from. In 2024, the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) and the Taiwan Textile Federation (TTF) discussed potential areas of collaboration between the two. However, due to the China factor, South Asian countries like Bangladesh continue to be extra careful regarding the Taiwan question.

Taiwan’s potential in South Asia

Taiwan’s lack of expertise in South Asia continues to hinder its outreach to South Asia. Increasing the number of region-specific study centres (such as South Asian Studies or India Studies) might be a good way for Taiwan to understand the region better. Region-specific study centres are likely to increase academic interaction and think tank-level policy dialogues. Another area for Taiwan to think about is tourism. Even though Taiwan realises the need to attract more Indian tourists, the non-revival of direct flights since the COVID-19 pandemic remains a problem. India is probably the only country in the region where it is feasible for Taiwan to operate direct flights.  In the case of Bangladesh, India’s visa restrictions are restricting Bangladeshi nationals’ access to advanced medical treatment in India and looking for alternative destinations. Not only that, but the circumstances also serve as a wakeup call for Bangladesh to strengthen its healthcare system to reduce its medical dependency on neighbouring countries like India. Therefore, foreign direct investment in the medical sector and medical tourism are both areas that Taiwan should consider.

Agriculture, with its allied sectors, remains the main livelihood source for both India and Bangladesh. As agriculture in South Asia mostly remained non-digitalised, the region can be a good destination for Taiwan to export digital agriculture equipment embracing smart technologies in agricultural development. Semiconductor industry collaboration is another area for Taiwan to think about in the case of South Asia. Semiconductor industry collaboration already benefits India-Taiwan relations, which has further room for exploration. Bangladesh, a developing economy and on track to graduate in 2026 as a middle-income country, also aims to tap into the semiconductor industry. The Bangladesh Semiconductor Industry Association (BSIA) aims for annual revenue of USD 1.0 billion and the creation of 10,000 jobs by 2030. The semiconductor industry is an area in which India and Bangladesh would be very interested in collaborating.

Other potential areas for cooperation and collaboration are environmental/green transformation, disaster prevention and management and fighting disinformation and fake news. Different parts of Bangladesh and India face floods almost every other year due to excessive rainfall during the monsoon season, which affects people’s livelihoods. Non-traditional security cooperation in capacity building and exchanging ideas for natural disasters like floods, cyclones, earthquakes, and health disasters might attract Dhaka’s and Delhi’s interest, where Taipei has good experience and expertise. India and Bangladesh are at high risk of climate change, having a third and ninth place on the World Risk Index 2024 for climate disaster risk. Lastly, Taiwan, which has expertise and experience in fighting misinformation, disinformation, and fake news, can reach out to share its merit and experience in countering digital disinformation.

Conclusion

Taiwan’s relations with South Asian countries remain confined to certain areas. The India case reflects a certain development in Delhi-Taipei relations, while in the case of Bangladesh, the China factor continues to act as the primary issue. The two case studies also indicate that Taiwan should consider each South Asian country based on its merit and potential and find areas of mutual interest. Despite limitations, there are many areas where collaboration between Taiwan and South Asian countries is possible without irritating Beijing. 

Raian Hossain is a doctoral researcher at the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham, UK. He is also a lecturer (currently on study leave) in the Department of Global Studies and Governance (GSG) at Independent University, Bangladesh (IUB). His areas of expertise include Indo-Pacific affairs, the US-China-India strategic triangle, Asian geopolitics, Bangladesh’s politics and foreign policy, and the Taiwan Issue in Sino-U.S. relations.

This article was published as part of a special issue on ‘Farewell 2024, Fresh start 2025?’.