The “super election year” of 2024 marked a turning point for South Asia, with elections in all the countries in the region: Bhutan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives and, of course, India. Two common trends stand out. There was the widespread exasperation with authoritarian regimes in place. The mass demonstrations of recent months and the tide of revolt that has swept Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan have been described by some local observers as a “South Asian spring”. The fight against corruption and calls for greater democracy and social justice were at the heart of the uprisings seeking to overturn an intolerable status quo.

But chants such as “India Out” also resonated during the protests, reflecting the failure of Narendra Modi’s interventionist policy. Since coming to power in 2014, the Indian prime minister’s diplomatic strategy has been guided by the “neighbourhood first” policy and a push to position his country as the dominant power in South Asia. Despite these efforts, the region has nonetheless become the theatre of Sino-Indian rivalry.

While new opportunities such as the economic and strategic initiatives provided by China go some way to explaining why various countries are distancing themselves from India, New Delhi’s perceived arrogance, asserting itself as the “natural ally” and an authoritarian “older brother”, has fuelled widespread anti-Indian sentiment in the region. This pushback stems from the long-standing interference in its neighbours’ internal affairs, such as the pressure exerted to ensure the signing of an imbalanced energy deal between Dhaka and the Adani Group, a conglomerate close to the Modi regime, or the Indian government’s objections to a Chinese research vessel’s stopover in a Sri Lankan port.

This wariness of India is not, however, solely rooted in recent history. The India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir is a point of friction that dates back to the partition in 1947 and continues to shape Indian foreign policy today. The revocation of Jammu and Kashmir’s constitutional autonomy in 2019 exacerbated tensions and tarnished India’s image, leading it to be more widely perceived as a domineering power that imposes its will and interests.

Bangladesh: uprisings and democratic reconstruction with India at arm’s length

An emblematic illustration of the flaws in this type of approach is the collapse of Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian regime in Bangladesh. In January 2024, the woman known as the “iron lady” unsurprisingly secured a fourth consecutive term after holding sham elections. Her party, the Awami League, controlled the country with an iron fist, systematically repressing all opposition forces, including workers and their representatives.

Corruption plagued the government and the administration, fomenting crony capitalism for the benefit of the elites, while the people, especially the young, were suffering the effects of inflation, jobless growth and the monopolisation of economic opportunities by the regime and its cronies.

In July 2024, the reintroduction of a quota system for public sector jobs, favouring those close to the government, triggered a mass uprising, fuelled by years of frustration. The response was brutal: curfews, internet blackouts and bloody repression. As the clashes reached their climax, Sheikh Hasina, no longer backed by the army, fled the country. A few days later, an interim government led by Muhammad Yunus, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006, was sworn in.

For fifteen years, India was unwavering in its support for Hasina, turning a blind eye to her abuses and authoritarian practices. An illustration of this support was Bangladesh’s invitation to the G20, chaired by India, in 2023 – a historic first for the country and a stamp of international legitimacy. And this backing continued until the run-up to the 2024 elections, despite international criticism.

In return, Bangladesh granted its powerful neighbour trade privileges reflecting an exploitative and subservient relationship, with agreements such as water “sharing”, facilities for goods transportation or cooperation in the fight against Islamist militancy. This asymmetrical relationship has fuelled animosity.

By relying exclusively on its alliance with Sheikh Hasina, the Modi government paid little heed to the internal dynamics in Bangladesh and, with the change of regime, has weakened its own influence in the region.

At the same time, hate speech by Hindu nationalists describing Bangladeshis as “termites” and “illegal immigrants” has heightened the level of ill feeling and mistrust. Such statements, combined with the discriminatory policies against Indian Muslims and the meddling in Bangladesh’s internal affairs, have exacerbated the hostility towards India. The climate of mistrust has not only weakened India’s influence but has also tarnished its reputation, marking a major strategic setback.

Reconfiguring the political balance in South Asia

Sri Lanka and Pakistan have also been rocked by widespread protests demanding the departure of their leaders, deemed incapable of governing in a fair, transparent and effective manner.

In Sri Lanka, the economic crisis has been marked by unsustainable debt, widespread shortages and rising living costs. The poverty rate almost doubled between 2021 and 2022, exceeding 25 per cent, and half a million workers lost their jobs in 2022, leading huge numbers of workers to emigrate. Economic collapse, coupled with years of mismanagement, stirred growing unrest, leading to the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. In 2024, Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD) was elected as leader of a left-wing coalition. Buoyed by popular support for a “change of system”, AKD embodied the hope of a fresh start in a country plagued by corruption and maladministration.

In Pakistan, the mobilisations have been driven by the country’s disastrous governance and the removal from office of Imran Khan, the former prime minister who is now in prison.

In both cases, citizens denounced an oligarchic political system that is out of touch with reality, as well as the over-reaching influence of the army in civil affairs. Both movements expressed a desire for democratic reform and social justice.

Although internal issues are at the root of the popular uprisings in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, they are also part of a context in which India’s dominance is being challenged. New Delhi has sought to use its geographical size and political clout to impose its dominance on the region, adopting “coercive diplomacy” based on influence and threats, and elevating itself to the role of arbiter in its neighbours’ international relations.

The rise to power of leaders less aligned with Indian interests – such as AKD in Sri Lanka, the interim government of Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh, the election of Mohammed Muizzu, who campaigned under the “India Out” banner, as president in Maldives, or the return of Nepalese Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, whose relations with New Delhi have been stormy in the past – have marked a turning point in regional relations.

Without completely breaking with the past, these new leaders have shown their will to temper India’s pretensions, to preserve their national sovereignty and maintain a delicate balance between India and China. Modi’s strategy of hegemonic ambition and control has spurred the “small” states of South Asia to diversify their partnerships and exploit the opportunities offered by Sino-Indian rivalry, while avoiding falling into the orbit of either one of the two powers.

The balance of power with China

India is faced with a twofold problem of asymmetry in South Asia. The first is its size, demography, economy and foreign policy, which combine to make it a giant compared with its neighbours. The second is the imbalance of power between China and India. In many areas – economic, industrial, technological, diplomatic, military, human development, etcetera – Beijing surpasses its rival. India is also dependent on China for a significant proportion of its imports.

It is with this in mind that China’s expansion into India’s traditional zone of influence, through investment in infrastructure via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and strategic alliances with countries bordering the Indian Ocean, is seen by New Delhi as a direct threat to its regional pre-eminence.

On entering his third term in office, Narendra Modi found himself confronted with a sizeable challenge. To overcome its “diplomatic debacle” in South Asia, New Delhi needs to rethink its approach. It must move away from a logic based solely on an obsession with fending off China and pursuing its own hegemonic interests, and look towards shared development, taking into account the interests and needs of the other countries in the neighbourhood. The region can only rise together. Many issues transcend borders: air pollution, water scarcity, migration, economic inequality, infrastructure, connectivity, etc. The future of a quarter of the world’s population depends on it.