TANG YUANJUN WAS ARRESTED by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in August 2024. He allegedly worked as a Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) asset between 2018 and 2023. He reported on the following categories of information that were of interest to the MSS:

• Prominent U.S.-based Chinese democracy activists and dissidents.
• US Chinese-American Member of Congress Xiong Yan, from New York.
• Immigration claims from dissidents wanting to leave China for the US.

According to the US Department of Justice (DoJ), Tang expressed his desire to see his aging family in China. A prominent dissident such as Tang would not be able to travel to China without being arrested, unless his travel had been approved by authorities. An acquaintance helped him establish secure online contact with the MSS. After being recruited, Tang reported to the MSS using an email account, encrypted chats, text messages and audio and video calls. Tang helped the MSS infiltrate a group chat on WhatsApp; used by numerous People’s Republic of China (PRC) dissidents and pro-democracy activists to communicate about pro-democracy issues and express criticism of the PRC government. In fact, this was what users called a “super group”. It is a group that consists of many other groups. Members could not even identify who was the sponsor of the group chats [1].

In addition, Tang reportedly video-recorded a June 2020 Zoom discussion commemorating the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre in the PRC. The Zoom online discussion was led by Zhou Fengsuo, Director of the June 4th Memorial Museum in New York City and a leading advocate for democracy in China. The Ministry of Public Security also infiltrated these discussions with the assistance of Zoom China and US based employees [2].

Tang was Secretary General of the overseas headquarters of the China Democratic Party United Headquarters in New York City. This non-profit organization assists mainland Chinese dissidents in immigration and asylum applications for the US. Tang allegedly provided information on these individuals to the MSS [3]. Tang also allegedly identified ten immigration attorneys to support MSS efforts to place assets in the US. Other dissident organizations in New York and Los Angeles provide similar visa application services to generate income.

In 2022, reportedly Tang met with the MSS in Changchun City, Jilin Province, China, where an officer installed a software on Tang’s phone which Tang believed to be a “bug” that caused all photographs and videos captured on the phone to be transmitted to the MSS. In his role as leading democracy advocate Tang encouraged dissidents to attend protests in Manhattan and Washington DC. He used the compromised phone to take photographs of the events. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) then used the photographs as evidence against overseas dissidents.

The DoJ claims that, on at least three occasions, Tang met with MSS officers in Macau or mainland China. Each time he traveled through intermediary countries to hide his travel to China. In January 2019, Tang traveled to Macau through Taipei, Taiwan; in April 2022, Tang traveled to mainland China through Incheon, South Korea; and in April 2023, Tang again traveled to Macau through Taipei.

The MSS allegedly polygraphed Tang prior to discussing operational activities. Tang then provided the MSS information about specific PRC Dissidents, including the information captured from one of Tang’s phones. Still, some US-based dissidents became suspicious of Tang when he traveled through the region and began making contradictory statements about the democracy effort and the CCP regime.

Status: Alleged

Tradecraft

• The MSS exploited Tang’s emotional bonds to his family to recruit him.
• Tang was provided an email account and passcode to begin communicating with the MSS.
• Tang traveled through intermediary countries to hide his travel to China.
• Tang communicated with the MSS through phone calls, video calls, audio messages, text and draft email messages.
• The MSS provided specialized software for Tang’s cellphone designed to send data including conversations and photos.
• Communicated with the MSS using a shared commercial video account.
• MSS used polygraph examinations in China to validate the asset.
• The MSS and the Ministry of Public Security coordinated their online infiltration of
• Chinese dissident groups operating in the US.

Notes

[1] Discussion with member dissident organizations, 8/26/2024

[2] US Department of Justice, United States vs. Xinjiang “Julien” Jin. Case: 1:20-mj-01103-RER. 2020

[3] Dissidents interviewed for this report say that the MSS exploits some democracy associations in New York and Los Angeles to identify dissidents attempting to flea China. In addition, the MSS exploits compromised dissident organizations by inserting recruited assets in that visa application process.

► Author: Nicholas Eftimiades* | Date: 05 September 2024 | Permalink

* Nicholas Eftimiades is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. He retired from a 34-year government career that included employment in the United States Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. He held appointments on the Department of Defense’s Defense Science Board and the Economic Security Subcommittee of the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Advisory Council. He is an advisor to the United States Intelligence Community. Eftimiades authored numerous works on China’s espionage methods. His books, Chinese Intelligence Operations (1994) and Chinese Espionage: Operations and Tactics (2020) are examinations of the structure, operations, and methodology of China’s intelligence services. They are widely regarded as seminal works in the field.