Over the past decade, tensions in the China-U.S. relationship have mounted to the point that many now speak of a “new cold war” between Beijing and Washington. U.S. policymakers have leaned into this dynamic, explicitly framing China as a “strategic competitor” and “America’s pacing threat.”

How do Chinese elites view the relationship?

That’s the question Dr. Yu Jie set out to answer in her new report, “China ‘under siege’: How the US’s hardening China policy is seen in Beijing.” Yu Jie, a senior research fellow on China in the Asia-Pacific Program at Chatham House, analyzed publications, officials remarks, and private conversations with top Chinese strategists to understand how elites in China are thinking about the China-U.S. relationship.

In this email interview with The Diplomat, Yu Jie explains common trends in China’s thinking about the United States as well as hotspot issues like Taiwan and the war in Ukraine. Overall, she says, “Beijing’s strategic community does not expect any significant improvement in the Sino-U.S. relationship before and after the U.S. elections in November 2024.”

In 2015, veteran China scholar David Lampton famously warned of a “tipping point” in China-U.S. relations, as American perceptions of China changed dramatically. Your paper traces a similar shift in Chinese perceptions of the U.S. – and hardening of official rhetoric – in the early 2020s. What explains the delay between U.S. and Chinese re-evaluations of the basic state of their relationship?

There are three main reasons of this delay in adjusting their bilateral ties: Firstly, the Chinese political elites didn’t consider the erratic Trump administration would last beyond 2020. They hoped that the election of U.S. President Joe Biden in 2020 might herald a softening of the confrontational China policy of his predecessor. However, these hopes have been dashed as President Biden has pursued a similarly tough China policy, executed in a more sophisticated, coordinated, and substantive manner. Beijing sees clear evidence of a containment strategy in Washington.

Secondly, Chinese leaders have deprioritized the typical buffers and stabilizers of the China-U.S. relationship such as trade and investment. The tangible benefits of the China-U.S. relationship in the past, namely trade and investment, have rapidly diminished due to increased commercial competitiveness and Beijing’s decisive pivot from low-end, export-led growth to a high-end manufacturing growth model.

And lastly, the thorniest and most risk-laden issues in China-U.S. relations, such as Taiwan and South China Sea, continue to add mistrust and upset the current status quo. Beijing considers stronger deterrence actions should be absolutely necessary to send warnings to Washington and its Indo-Pacific allies.

If most Chinese strategists believe that the deterioration of China-U.S. relations is now more or less permanent, then what is Beijing’s goal regarding China-U.S. interactions? The Biden administration has repeatedly stressed the need for “guardrails” and conflict management. Is that China’s hope as well?

China’s ultimate goal is to ensure that the further erosion of China-U.S. relations does not hinder domestic economic growth, which is key to giving the ruling regime legitimacy. The overall strategy for Beijing to deal with the U.S. is to minimize damage from Washington by maximizing China’s economic and political influence in the rest of the world, most notably with large parts of the Global South. Such a move might well buy time for China to speed up its own economic resilience and technology development.

As for the phrase “guardrails,” it was hugely dismissed by the Chinese political elites. The guardrails implies someone set the rules and others to follow. However, Beijing does not only want to become the follower of rules set by the U.S. in this bilateral relationship. It asks for a significant equity in deciding the rules.

You note a strong pessimism among Chinese experts about the potential of “peaceful reunification,” with many experts arguing that Taiwan’s government would not agree to unification with the mainland absent strong coercion. Is there any introspection about why the DPP has adopted a hardline stance on China – and been re-elected to the presidency three times in a row by Taiwan’s people?

A noticeable feature from Beijing is the growing sense of urgency to deter pro-independence supporters and the sharp criticism of “separatists” inside Taiwan, as President Xi and his lieutenants have made several official comments on various occasions – particularly after Nancy Pelosi, at the time speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, visited Taipei. Both changes reflect Xi’s own belief that there has been a serious deterioration of the Sino-U.S. relationship. Related to this shift, Chinese leaders and official media use coded vocabulary, such as “external forces,” to criticize U.S. interference in matters related to Taiwan under both the Trump and Biden administrations.

Despite no formal changes of wording in Beijing’s political blueprints on Taiwan, on balance Chinese political elites and influential scholars consider the current situation to be precarious with the pro-independence DPP government in Taiwan, which is likely to result in more active Chinese deterrents to confront the Taiwanese government as well as the incoming U.S. president, irrespective of who that is.

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there’s a strong sense among European analysts that China has “lost” Europe due to its support for Russia. Do Chinese strategists agree? And if so, how important is this factor for China’s national interests?

The Chinese strategic community has intensely debated the three challenges related to the war in Ukraine. The subject has raised many questions that have proven difficult to answer, including: to what extent can China support Russia and maintain stable ties with both the U.S. and Europe, while not facing secondary sanctions from the collective West? When and how will the war end? Should China play a more active mediation role between Russia and Ukraine given the current stalemate on the battlefield?

In fact, Chinese experts opinions are divided on the fundamental questions of whether China should align with Russia and what the likely repercussions would be for China’s ties with the U.S. and Europe. However, there is also a strong view among many Chinese international affairs specialists that even if Beijing sided with Europe, Europeans would not have responded in kind; and the transatlantic alliance countering China would not be weakened by China’s stances to this war. One can confirm that Beijing’s damage limitation efforts have not been well received in some European capitals.

China’s strong inclination to sustain its ties with Russia goes well beyond the Kremlin’s military adventure. Its return on investments is still framed by its response to the United States’ pursuit of a China containment strategy. Beijing believes its relations with Moscow might well bring a necessary (if imperfect) solution in dealing with U.S. policy in both economic and diplomatic terms.

How does China view the upcoming U.S. election? Is there a clear preference for either Donald Trump or Kamala Harris?

With the U.S. presidential candidates likely to compete with one another to sound tough on China, Beijing’s strategic community does not expect any significant improvement in the Sino-U.S. relationship before or after the U.S. elections in November 2024.

With the possible return of Donald Trump, Chinese leaders will likely reinforce the narrative that the U.S. is the single and most disruptive source of global instability, while portraying China as a responsible and confident world power able to stand up to the U.S. hegemony. For Beijing, the return of Donald Trump might well be a rare opportunity to recalibrate its bilateral relationship with the U.S., as he is often willing to make deals outside traditional political parameters. However, his leadership style will cause further anxiety for Chinese leaders as Trump tends to focus on his own interests regardless of the consequences, as was illustrated by the Trump administration ignoring the well-established approach of generations of U.S. and Chinese leaders to Taiwan.

On Harris, Beijing naturally considers she will continue to carry forward the Biden administration’s China policy and strengthen the United States’ influence in the Indo-Pacific. As a result, there is not a clear preference for Harris or Trump.