During America’s 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton’s political strategist, James Carville, famously summed up the race with the phrase, “It’s the economy, stupid.” Carville’s point was that the election would be decided on the economy. If Clinton wished to win, Carville argued, his campaign would need to focus relentlessly on economic concerns. Clinton heeded Carville’s advice and won the election.

Fast forward to 2024, and a similar focus may be needed for U.S. diplomats seeking to fortify America’s leadership in East Asia and the Pacific. There is risk in taking this analogy too far, of course. It is undeniably the case that multiple countries in the region face serious security threats emanating from China’s revanchist ambitions and North Korea’s nuclear saber-rattling. Pacific island nations also face existential risks from the effects of climate change. At its core, though, the business of Asia remains business. And presently, America is underperforming on the top issue that matters most to many people in the region. Beijing is not wasting the opportunity to attempt to fill the vacuum being created by America’s diminishing leadership on trade issues in Asia. Left unaddressed, this dynamic risks eroding America’s influence in the world’s most dynamic region, with negative potential implications for Washington’s leadership on the world stage.

This partly explains why there is much more ambivalence about the outcome of the U.S. presidential election in many parts of Asia than in other regions, such as Europe. In Europe, there is palpable anxiety about the potential return of former President Donald J. Trump to the White House, given Trump’s open skepticism of NATO.

Based on recent travels across the Asia-Pacific region as a member of a Chatham House-led fact-finding mission, as well as in other recent trips, I have not detected comparable levels of anxiety about the outcome of the U.S. election, at least among the current and former officials, experts, and business leaders with whom I met. Nobody I spoke with described the U.S. election as representing a fork in the trajectory of the region’s relationship with the United States. Asian counterparts described having dealt with both the Trump and Biden-Harris administrations over the past eight years. There was neither anxiety about Trump nor nostalgia for the Biden-Harris administration. Just matter-of-factness about the evolving distribution of power within Asia and the need for regional governments to adapt accordingly.

Neither presidential candidate is sparking a regional groundswell

Much of this guarded ambivalence stemmed from a set of interlocking judgments about America’s approach to the region. First, there is concern that the United States is losing sight of what it takes to lead in the region as America becomes ever more fixated on great power competition with China. Second, neither Trump nor Harris has articulated a vision for American leadership in Asia on trade and economic issues. Trump has threatened across-the-board tariffs on all imports, which would do direct harm to Asian economies if enacted. In addition to dulling demand by raising prices for exports from Asian markets, tariffs and countermeasures could wreak havoc on regional supply chains. Many product supply chains currently operate in a near-symphonious manner to keep production moving across Asia, but these supply chains could be upended if more global and regional production shifts to national production. Interlocutors characterized Trump’s tariff plan and its consequences as a potential future harm. In the moment, however, they were focused on the present harm they argued was being caused by America’s turn toward industrial policy, greater protectionism, and “friend-shoring.” They broadly asserted that these approaches were creating more benefits for America than for its partners.

Here’s why: Through incentives from the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, the U.S. government has made it more attractive for many leading-edge Asian firms to invest in expanding production in the United States instead of in their home markets. This has led to a record surge of inbound investment into the United States over the past year. With strong bipartisan backing for reviving American manufacturing, most interlocutors with whom I met expect the United States to attract even more inbound investment from Asia in the years ahead. This may benefit the bottom lines of major Asian companies that will receive American subsidies for producing in the United States. On the flip side of the coin, though, many Asian interlocutors fear it will hollow out their local communities and eliminate opportunities for a rising generation of workers across Asia.

American officials’ pledges to promote higher labor and environmental standards, combat corruption, and build greater supply chain resilience have been described by Asian counterparts as self-serving justifications for Washington’s current policy course, rather than as markers of progress in advancing a shared vision toward a better future. There does not appear to be broad buy-in for America’s current flagship economic initiative, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.

Asia is navigating between America and China

At the same time, many officials, experts, and business leaders expressed concern that they were facing a similar threat from Chinese firms. Driven by a determination to secure the commanding heights of emerging technologies such as electric vehicles, batteries, and clean energy technologies, Beijing is showering benefits on Chinese companies in these sectors. These benefits are helping Chinese national champions climb value chains and compete more directly with advanced manufacturers in developed economies such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. As Chinese production in these critical technologies far exceeds the country’s domestic demand, these products are spilling out across the region and depressing prices. Many regional economies thus are facing a squeeze in both directions from American and Chinese competition.

Counterparts in various Asian countries shared a fairly common view about how governments and companies would position themselves vis-à-vis China going forward. They predicted there will not be geographically fixed blocs with countries sorting into pro-American or pro-Chinese camps. Instead, there will be greater fluidity. Regional countries will position themselves along a continuum between the United States and China based on the issues at hand and their own national situations. Over the coming months, there almost certainly will be greater hedging on China across much of the region, as countries wait for the next U.S. administration to provide direction on America’s strategy toward China before making decisions on where to position themselves between both major powers. Beijing is presently taking advantage of this interregnum to try to stabilize relations with many of America’s partners across the region, including Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam.

Concerningly for American influence in Asia, the issues that are consuming the most policy attention in Washington are not the issues on the top of the minds of regional leaders. Most notably, the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East are largely viewed as distant problems with tangential impacts on lives in Asia. There are notable exceptions to this point. For example, America’s image has been battered in Southeast Asian countries with large Muslim populations over the past year since the outbreak of the conflict in the Middle East. And threat perceptions in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have been elevated by the conflict in Ukraine. Particularly in South Korea, there is a widespread view that Russia-North Korea relations are rapidly deepening. As ties between Moscow and Pyongyang expand, the thinking goes, North Korea will grow more emboldened and China’s capacity to restrain North Korean adventurousness will be further diminished. This is a space that will require careful watching in the coming period.

China’s rapid military build-up and North Korea’s expanding arsenal pose real threats to countries in the region. America cannot waver in fielding a strong deterrent presence if it wishes to retain its relevance as a leading actor and a balancer against an increasingly aggressive China. By the same token, Washington also cannot treat its military presence as a substitute for an affirmative economic agenda if it wishes to retain a strong regional leadership position.

America’s post-election opportunity

America’s 2024 election offers an opening for Washington to update its regional approach. Washington would do well to reframe its narrative about its role in Asia’s economy. For the United States, an affirmative economic agenda is a matter of national security. It is essential for America to be viewed as an enduring leader in Asia, as opposed to a fading one.

If the United States continues to view its leadership in East Asia and the Pacific as underpinning its leadership on the world stage, then deeper economic integration between the United States and the region is critical to U.S. national security. It must be addressed with the urgency and focus that such threats demand. American leaders must fashion economic policies strategically to ensure that they support and do not undermine American leadership in Asia. As a start, America’s next presidential administration should contribute more and exercise greater leadership in regional efforts around digital trade, supply chain resilience, and the clean energy transition.

Lastly, American leaders would do well to share the goals of their strategy on China with their partners in the region. Does Washington seek to nudge China into acting in a more market-driven and less predatory manner? Can Washington tolerate China’s continued economic growth, albeit at lower rates than before? Or is the goal to choke China’s growth to starve its military-industrial complex of money and industrial might? If the latter, this will have profound implications for the regional economy, which is interwoven with China’s through raw inputs entering China and intermediate goods exiting it.

The upcoming U.S. presidential transition provides an opportunity for Washington to fill in some of the gaps and uncertainties that are top-of-mind concerns for leaders and leading thinkers in East Asia and the Pacific. The next administration should seize this opportunity, as it will be inheriting a solid foundation from the Biden administration, which has invested heavily and notched major progress in strengthening alliances and partnerships across Asia. To make further progress, the next administration will need to advance an affirmative vision for how America will contribute to elevating prosperity across the Asia-Pacific region.